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CONGRESS CLEARS ITS THROAT 
Edward A. Hartnett* 
The Schiavo case involved many difficult issues including 
diagnosis, prognosis, causation, intent, procedural due process, 
substantive due process, and litigation strategy. This article does 
not address any of those complex issues, 1 but instead discusses 
the Act of Congress providing for federal jurisdiction and the 
remarkable opinion issued by Judge Stanley F. Birch, Jr., finding 
that Act unconstitutional. Although not a single one of the other 
ten circuit judges who participated in the case joined his opin-
ion-and two specifically rejected it-Judge Birch's opinion at-
tracted considerable attention. Andrew Cohen of CBS News, for 
example, praised Judge Birch as "the only true unvarnished 
hero" in the case.2 
• Richard J. Hughes Professor for Constitutional and Public Law and Service, 
Seton Hall University School of Law. Thanks to Patrick Thompson and David Boyd for 
research assistance. 
I. Other than to note the one thing in these difficult issues that seems simple to 
me: if a person has a substantive due process right against the state forcing her to eat, see 
Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), she must have a substantive due 
process right against the state forcing her not to eat, just as if a person has a substantive 
due process right against the state forcing her to carry a pregnancy to term, see Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833 (1992), she must have a substantive due process right against the state forcing her not 
to carry a pregnancy to term, see, e.g., Arnold v. Board of Educ. of Escambia County, 880 
F.2d 305, 311 (11th Cir. 1989); cf Casey, 505 U.S. at 980 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting 
that there is "no comparable tradition barring recognition of a 'liberty interest' in carry-
ing one's child to term free from state efforts to kill it" and that the notion that "the only 
way to protect childbirth is to protect abortion ... drives one to say that the only way to 
protect the right to eat is to acknowledge the constitutional right to starve oneself to 
death"). 
2. Andrew Cohen, CBS News: Terri Schiavo and the Constitution, (CBS television 
broadcast March 31, 2005), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/03/31 
/opinionlcourtwatch/main68418l.shtml. See also Laurence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, 
8 GREEN BAG 2d 291, 300 (2005) (describing Judge Birch as "an Establishment Republi-
can" who "went out of his way to criticize Congress and the second President Bush for 
flagrantly violating" the "usual formulas of federalism, separation of powers, and the rule 
of law"). 
After this article was submitted, but before it went to press, two papers defending 
the constitutionality of the Act appeared in print. See Steven G. Calabresi, The Terri 
Schiavo Case: In Defense of the Special Law Enacted by Congress and President Bush, 
100 Nw. U. L. REv. 151 (2006); Michael P. Allen, Congress and Terri Schiavo: A Primer 
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The opinion is remarkable in a number of ways. It decries 
judicial activism, but goes out of its way to conclude that an Act 
of Congress is unconstitutional. It emphasizes judicial duty to the 
law, but neither discusses the legal standard applicable to the de-
cision then before the court nor even supports the vote that 
Judge Birch casts on that decision. It makes far-ranging and un-
supportable legal assertions, but takes nearly all of them back in 
response to Judge Tjoflat's dissent. Despite its remarkable flaws, 
Judge Birch's opinion nevertheless does serve to bring into focus 
significant concerns about singling out for federal jurisdiction an 
individual case already decided in state court. 
On March 21, 2005, the President signed into law an Act for 
the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo.3 That act did 
not create any substantive rights, but instead provided for fed-
eral jurisdiction in the United States District Court for the Mid-
dle District of Florida over "a suit or claim by or on behalf of 
Theresa Marie Schiavo for the alleged violation of any right of 
Theresa Marie Schiavo under the Constitution or laws of the 
United States relating to the withholding or withdrawal of food, 
fluids, or medical treatment necessary to sustain her life."4 The 
act also provided standing for Schiavo's parents, called for a de 
novo determination notwithstanding state proceedings, and pro-
hibited delay, abstention, or imposition of an exhaustion re-
quirement.5 
On March 22, the District Court denied a motion for a tem-
porary restraining order, and a panel of the Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the next day.6 On March 25, the 
District Court denied a second motion for a temporary restrain-
ing order, and a panel of the Court of Appeals again affirmed. 7 
Schiavo's parents petitioned for rehearing en bane, and on 
March 30, the Court of Appeals denied the petition.8 Judge 
Birch concurred in the denial of rehearing en bane and wrote an 
opinion concluding that the Act for the Relief of the Parents of 
on the American Constitutional Order?, 108 W.VA. L REV. 309 (2005). 
3. Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. 109-3, 119 
Stat. 15 (2005). 
4. Id. § 1, 119 Stat. 15. 
5. Id. § 2. 
6. Schiavo ex rei. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (M.D. Fla. 2005), 
aff d, 403 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2005). 
7. Schiavo ex rei. Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (M.D. Fla. 2005), 
affd, 403 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005). 
8. Schiavo ex rei. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F. 3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2005). 
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Theresa Marie Schiavo, signed into law nine days earlier, was 
unconstitutional. 9 
I. JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
When courts of appeals deny rehearing en bane, they rarely 
issue opinions. Indeed, they rarely even report individual votes, 
instead simply reporting that the requisite majority did not vote 
in favor. In the Schiavo case, five of the eleven participating 
judges revealed and explained their votes. Three of them ex-
plained why they did not vote in favor of rehearing en banc;10 
two explained why they did vote in favor." The majority of 
judges, as is traditional, neither revealed nor explained their 
vote. Judge Birch spoke out. 12 
Judge Birch begins and ends his opinion with a discussion of 
judicial activism, and defends his actions as avoiding judicial ac-
tivism. For some, the term "judicial activism" is an empty epi-
thet, meaning little more than that the one who hurls the term 
disagrees with a particular decision or line of decisions.13 While 
there is little doubt that some use the term this way,14 it is never-
theless "a helpful category" if used with some care because "it 
focuses attention on the judiciary's institutional role rather than 
the merits of particular decisions. "15 
Judge Birch defines a judicial activist as "one who decides 
the outcome of a controversy before him or her according to 
9. 404 F.3d at 1271 (Birch, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en bane). 
10. See 404 F.3d at 1271 (Birch, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en bane); 
404 F.3d at 1278 (Carnes, J., joined by Hull, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en 
bane). 
II. 404 F.3d at 1279 (Tjoflat, J., joined by Wilson, J., dissenting from denial of re-
hearing en bane). 
12 Cf. 20 Questions for Circuit Judge Stanley F. Birch, Jr., of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, available at http://howappealing.law.com/20q/ 
2003_10_01_20q-appellateblog_archive.html: 
Judge [Sidney] Smith displayed to himself a plaque on his desk and on his bench 
bearing the acronym "KYDMS." After a while I inquired as to its meaning. 
"Keep your damn mouth shut" was his answer and his approach-one that 
many judges should embrace. 
13. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Is the Rehnquist Coun an "Activist" Coun? The 
Commerce Clause Cases, 73 U. COLO. L. REv. 1275, 1276 (2002) (noting his belief that 
the term "while clearly pejorative, is generally empty" and "usually refers to an action 
taken by a court of which the speaker disapproves"). 
14. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, 100 MICH. L. REv. 
2008, 2019 (2002) ("I often have the sense that judicial activism is simply the label used 
for decisions one does not like."). 
15. Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. 
REv. 1139, 1141 (2002). 
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personal conviction, even one sincerely held, as opposed to the 
dictates of the law as constrained by legal precedent and, ulti-
mately, our Constitution."16 The contrast between personal con-
viction and law is not a very helpful definition of judicial acti-
vism, for few (at least among those who think that such a distinc-
tion can be drawn at all) would defend judges deciding cases on 
the basis of personal conviction rather than law.17 Indeed, deci-
sion according to personal conviction rather than law may be 
more properly characterized as lawlessness rather than activism. 
(And who would possibly defend judges deciding cases on the 
basis of :nsincere personal convictions?) 
The emphasis on precedent is more helpful: one dimension 
of judicial activism is a lack of deference to the legal interpreta-
tions of other judges.18 But activism is better understood more 
generally as a lack of deference to the legal interpretations of 
others. As Professor Ernest Young has put it, the "common 
thread" that links the various forms of judicial activism is that 
"they all involve a refusal by the court deciding a particular case 
to defer to other sorts of authority at the expense of its own 
judgment about the correct legal outcome."19 Probably the most 
widely noted form of judicial activism involves a lack of defer-
ence to elected representatives.Z0 
16. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1271 (11th Cir. 2005) (Birch, J., concurring in denial of 
rehearing en bane). 
17. See, e.g., Rosemary Barkett, The Tyranny of LAbels, 38 SUFF. U. L. REv. 749, 
757 (2005) ("Indeed, how many opinions acknowledge that a judge is refusing to apply 
the law?"). But see TERRI JENNINGS PERETII, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 
(1999). 
18. See Young, supra note 15, at 1144, 1149-51. 
19. /d. at 1145. See also William P. Marshall, Conservatives and the Seven Sins of 
Judicial Activism, 73 U. CoLO. L. REV. 1217,1232-36 (2002). 
20. Marshall, supra note 19, at 1223 ("The term judicial activism is most often asso-
ciated with judicial invalidation of decisions by elected representatives."). See Young, 
supra note 15, at 1144-47 (listing as his first category of judicial activism the "second-
guessing [of] the federal political branches or state governments"); Lino A. Graglia, It's 
Not Constitutionalism, It's Judicial Activism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 293, 295 & n.ll 
(1996) ("By judicial activism I mean, quite simply and specifically, the practice by judges 
of disallowing policy choices by other governmental officials or institutions that the Con-
stitution does not clearly prohibit"); id. at n.ll ("If democracy is the norm, the view of 
the legislature, correctable by the people, should prevail over the view of the judiciary 
when the issue is in doubt."); Michael C. Dorf, The Good Society, Commerce, and the 
Rehnquist Court, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2161, 2177 n.91 (2001) (noting that while there 
"are numerous definitions of judicial activism," he was "using the term ... to mean any 
view of judicial review that leads to substantially more frequent counter-majoritarian 
decision-making that one would expect under an approach like the one described in 
James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitu-
tional Law, 7 HARV. L. REv. 129 (1893)"). 
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It is remarkable that in an opinion framed by criticism of 
judicial activism, Judge Birch concludes that an Act of Congress 
is unconstitutional without so much as mentioning the presump-
tion that Acts of Congress are constitutional or addressing 
whether a court owes any deference to the constitutional inter-
pretation of Congress and the President.21 Instead, he contrasts 
the fervor and passion of Congress and the President to his own 
"dispassionate discharge of duty.'m Yet as Professor Richard 
Freer has noted, the decision to write the opinion at all suggests 
that Judge Birch "feels very strongly."23 
Perhaps still more remarkable in an opinion that decries ju-
dicial activism is the vision of the judicial role the opinion trum-
pets: far from the modest (and correct) judicial duty of deciding 
particular cases, Judge Birch proclaims that "when the fervor of 
political passions moves the Executive and the Legislative 
branches to act in ways inimical to basic constitutional principles, 
it is the duty of the judiciary to intervene.''24 
II. THE QUESTION BEFORE THE EN BANC COURT 
The question before the full Court of Appeals was whether 
to order rehearing en bane. The question to be decided on a pe-
tition for rehearing en bane is not whether the district court 
judgment was correct-that is the question to be decided by the 
en bane court if the petition is granted. Thus by reaching out to 
decide the constitutional issue, Judge Birch was engaged in an-
other form of judicial activism: reaching out to decide an issue 
not yet before him?5 
21. He does criticize both the district court and the court of appeals for "in-
dulg[ing]" a very different kind of presumption of constitutionality: presuming, without 
deciding, that the Act of Congress is constitutional while denying relief on other grounds. 
See Schiavo, 404 F.3d at 1272 (arguing that the district court and court of appeals thereby 
exercised an illegitimate hypothetical jurisdiction). 
22. Id. at 1271, 1276. 
23. Elaine Silvestrini, Judge Assails Schiavo Law, TAMPA TRIBUNE, Apr. 1, 2005, 
available at http://www.tampatrib.com/MGBILZGIY6E.html. See also Tribe, supra note 
2, at 300 (noting that Judge Birch "went out of his way to criticize Congress and the sec-
ond President Bush"). 
24. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005). 
25. See Young, supra note 15, at 1152: 
When we call the Court "activist" because it "reaches out" to decide an issue 
not strictly before it . . . we are complaining about judicial maximalism. This 
form of activism shares with the other types ... a refusal to defer to other actors 
in the system. A court that habitually reaches out to decide constitutional issues 
unnecessary to the resolution of the particular case before it ... will tend to in-
crease the occasions for invalidation of political-branch decisions. A court that 
tends to announce sweeping rules . . . is refusing to defer to future courts in 
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Rule 35 of the Federal Ru1es of Appellate Procedure states: 
An en bane hearing or rehearing is not favored and ordinarily 
will not be ordered unless: 
(1) en bane consideration is necessary to secure or maintain 
uniformity of the court's decisions; or 
(2) the proceeding involves a question of exceptional impor-
tance. 
Despite intonin~ that "the time has come for dispassionate dis-
charge of duty," 6 Judge Birch never mentions this standard. 
Nor does he apply it. Judge Birch concurs in the denial of 
rehearing en bane, but his explanation has nothing to do with the 
applicable legal standard. On the contrary, to the extent that his 
opinion is relevant to the question before him at all, it supports 
the opposite conclusion: that the case "involves a question of ex-
ceptional importance" -whether an Act of Congress creating 
federal jurisdiction is unconstitutional-and therefore should be 
reheard en bane. 
Indeed, if Judge Birch were correct in his constitutional 
analysis, then the panel decision was wrong: it should not have 
affirmed the District Court's order. Instead, it shou1d have va-
cated the District Court's order with instructions to dismiss the 
case for lack of jurisdiction. Judge Birch seems to think that 
when a court of appeals determines that federal Jurisdiction is 
lacking it shou1d not take "any further action." 7 But this is 
clearly wrong.28 The point becomes obvious when one considers 
a case in which a district court granted relief in the absence of 
jurisdiction. Surely a court of appeals shou1d not refuse to take 
"any further action" in such a case, thereby leaving the district 
court decision in place. Instead, when a court of appeals decides 
much the same way that courts departing from precedent have refused to defer 
to past tribunals. 
26. Schiavo, 404 F.3d at 1271. 
27. /d. 
28. See U.S. Bancorp v. Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. 18,21 (1994) ("Of course, no statute 
could authorize a federal court to decide the merits of a legal question not posed in an 
Article Ill case or controversy. For that purpose, a case must exist at all the stages of ap-
pellate review. But reason and authority refute the quite different notion that a federal 
appellate court may not take any action with regard to a piece of litigation once it has 
been determined that the requirements of Article Ill no longer are (or indeed never 
were) met. That proposition is contradicted whenever an appellate court holds that a dis-
trict court lacked Article III jurisdiction in the first instance, vacates the decision, and 
remands with directions to dismiss.") (citations omitted}. 
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that federal jurisdiction never existed in a case, it should vacate 
prior decisions in the case and order the dismissal of the case for 
lack of jurisdiction. 
Judge Birch's opinion is remarkable, then, both in reaching 
out to decide a constitutional issue not before him and in pre-
senting an argument that the panel was wrong as an explanation 
for why he concurs is declining to disturb what the panel did. 
III. TREATING STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW 
DOCTRINES AS CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
Judge Birch makes a number of startling arguments that 
seek to elevate statutory and common law principles into consti-
tutional principles. He claims that the Rooker-Feldman doc-
trine,29 which bars inferior federal courts from exercising appel-
late jurisdiction over state court judgments, should have been 
applied.30 The problem with this claim is that the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine is not a constitutional doctrine at all. Instead, 
that doctrine is a product of statutory interpretation. As a 
unanimous Supreme Court reiterated on the very day that Judge 
Birch issued his opinion, "the District Courts in Rooker and 
Feldman lacked subject matter jurisdiction" because the statute 
governing the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, "as long interpreted, 
vests authority to review a state court's judgment solely in this 
Court. "31 To conclude, as the text of his opinion suggests, that 
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides a basis for holding a 
statute unconstitutional would be a plain misreading of Rooker 
and Feldman. 
Nor is there any basis for concluding, apart from Rooker 
and Feldman, that Congress lacks the constitutional power to 
give inferior federal courts appellate jurisdiction over state court 
judgments. Alexander Hamilton suggested not only the constitu-
tionality of such an arrangement, but also its advisability.32 The 
29. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. 
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 
30. Schiavo, 404 F.3d at 1272. 
31. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280,292 (2005). 
32. THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 420 (Alexander Hamilton) (G. Wills ed., 1982) ("I 
perceive at present no impediment to the establishment of an appeal from the state 
courts to the subordinate national tribunals; and many advantages attending the power of 
doing it may be imagined. It would diminish the motives to the multiplication of federal 
courts, and would admit of arrangements calculated to contract the appellate jurisdiction 
of the supreme court. The state tribunals may then be left with a more entire charge of 
federal causes; and appeals in most cases in which they may be deemed proper instead of 
being carried to the supreme court, may be made to lie from the state courts to the dis-
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Supreme Court in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee treated removal as a 
form of appellate jurisdiction.33 And it is commonplace to con-
ceive of federal habeas for those in custody pursuant to a state 
court judgment of conviction as effectively a form of appellate 
review of state judgments. As a unanimous Supreme Court 
noted in Exxon, "Congress, if so minded, may explicitly em-
power district courts to oversee state court judgments and has 
done so, most notably, in authorizing federal habeas review of 
state prisoners' petitions."34 Federal habeas for those in state 
custody pursuant to a judgment of conviction is plainly inconsis-
tent with any notion that the constitution precludes inferior fed-
eral courts from revisiting determinations made by state courts. 
Despite what he says in text, Judge Birch acknowledges in a 
footnote that Congress has the constitutional power to "author-
izeD federal appellate review of final state court decisions. "35 In 
the footnote, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not presented as 
an argument for finding the Act unconstitutional, but instead 
trict courts of the union."). 
33. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-51 (1816). Thus Congress could have provided for 
the removal of the Schiavo case from state court into federal district court for trial. Al-
though current removal statutes operate pre-judgment, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1453 
(2002), this was not always the case and there is no general constitutional bar to post-
judgment removal. See Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780,795 (1966) (noting that the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 provided for post-judgment removal but that "Congress eliminated 
post-judgment removal when it enacted § 641 of the Revised Statutes of 1874"); cf 
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID SHAPIRO, HART AND 
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERALCOURTSANDTIIEFEDERALSYSTEM, 917-18 (5th ed. 2003) 
(asking whether Congress may have inadvertently resurrected post-judgment removal of 
some criminal cases in 1977). 
Post-judgment removal is limited by the Seventh Amendment, which prohibits re-
examination of facts found by a jury except in accordance with the rules of the common 
law, The Justices v. Murray, 76 U.S. 274 (1869), but there is no similar constitutional bar 
to re-examination of facts found by a judge. See 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGIIT & 
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAcriCE AND PROCEDURE§ 2572, at 483 (1995) ("The 
Seventh Amendment applies only in cases at common law tried to a jury. If there is no 
jury, either because there was no right to a jury trial or because the right has been 
waived, the constitutional bar against reexamination has no application.") 
Although the Court once stated that post-judgment removal would require "setting 
aside the trial and judgment of the State court as of no validity" and that under Murray, 
"legislation directed to that end, where, at least, the trial has been by jury, would be of 
doubtful validity," Stevenson v. Williams, 86 U.S. 572,576 (1873), it gave no reason at all 
to suggest that Murray should reach beyond jury trials. See Robert D. Goldstein, Blyew: 
Variation on a Jurisdictional Scheme, 41 STAN. L. REv. 469,514 (1989) (pointing out that 
Murray "was of no consequence" to cases outside the scope of the Seventh Amendment, 
such as equity cases, and criticizing the Commission on Revision and Consolidation of 
the Statutes of the United States for eliminating "the important provision for postjudg-
ment removal," perhaps because "it was influenced, and overly so," by Murray). 
34. Exxon Mobil, 125 S. a. at 1526 n.8. 
35. Schiavo, 404 F.3d at 1272 n.3. 
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merely the doctrine that remains after concluding that the Act is 
unconstitutional on other grounds not yet explained. 36 
And what are those other grounds? Judge Birch argues that 
the Act is unconstitutional because it sets a standard of review, 
provides for federal adjudication notwithstanding prior state 
court determinations, and eliminates ~udicial power to abstain or 
require exhaustion of state remedies. 
As Judges Tjoflat and Wilson note, "to hold that Congress 
may not establish or alter standards of review would wreak 
havoc on dozens of federal statutes that do just that in numerous 
contexts. "38 The landmark and pervasive Administrative Proce-
dure Act, for example, provides that the "reviewing court 
shall ... hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and 
conclusions found to be -arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of dis-
cretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law ... [or] unsup-
ported by substantial evidence."39 Consider, too, the statute es-
tablishing a standard of review of decisions by United States 
Magistrate Judges,40 the statute establishing a standard of review 
after court-annexed arbitration,41 the statute establishing a stan-
dard of review after contractual arbitration,42 the statute estab-
lishing a standard of review of evidentiary rulings,43 and the stat-
ute establishing a standard of review of district court sentencing 
decisions.44 Indeed, where "a statute ... does not explicitly set 
36. Id. 
37. ld. at 1273-77. This aspect of Judge Birch's opinion is itself activist. See Young, 
supra note 15, at 1144 (listing as one category of activism "issuing broad or 'maximalist' 
holdings rather than narrow or 'minimalist' ones"). 
38. Schiavo, 404 F.3d at 1280 n.5 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
bane). 
39. 5 u.s.c. § 706 (2000). 
40. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (2000) ("A judge ofthe court may reconsider any pre-
trial matter ... when it has been shown that the magistrate's order is clearly erroneous or 
contrary to law."); 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1) (2000) ("A judge of the court shall make a de 
novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or rec-
ommendations to which objection is made."). 
41. 28 U.S.C. § 657(c) (2000) (providing that "any party may file a written demand 
for trial de novo in the district court"). 
42. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2002) (providing that the award may be vacated if it was pro-
cured by "corruption, fraud, or undue means," if an arbitrator demonstrated "evident 
partiality," or engaged in certain enumerated forms of "misconduct" or "misbehavior"). 
43. FED. R. EVID. 103(a) ("Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits 
or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected .... "); FED. R. 
EVID. 103(d) ("Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting sub-
stantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of the court."). See also 28 
U.S.C. § 2105 (2000) ("There shall be no reversal in the Supreme Court or a court of ap-
peals for error in ruling upon matters in abatement which do not involve jurisdiction."). 
44. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2002) (providing that the "court of appeals shall determine 
whether the sentence-(!) was imposed in violation of law; (2) was imposed as a result of 
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forth a standard of review [it] may nonetheless do so implic-
itly. "45 Establishing a standard of review is necessary and proper 
for carrying into execution the judicial power. And the Constitu-
tion gives Congress, not the judiciary, the power to make all laws 
that are necessary and proper for carrying into execution the ju-
dicial power. 46 
an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines; (3) is outside the applicable guide-
line range ... ; or (4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no applicable sen-
tencing guideline and is plainly unreasonable."). See also id.: 
The court of appeals shall give due regard to the opportunity of the district 
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and shall accept the findings of 
fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous and ... shall give due 
deference to the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts. With 
respect to determinations under subsection (3)(A) or (3)(B), the court of ap-
peals shall review de novo the district court's application of the guidelines to the 
facts. 
Cf United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261-62 (2005) (relying on inferences from this 
statute to determine a standard of review after concluding, on jury trial grounds, that the 
provision could not stand as written). 
45. Booker, 543 U.S. at 259-61. 
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (providing Congress with the power to "make all Laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all other Powers 
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Depart-
ment or Officer thereof'). See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by 
Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effed of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 
1535, 1582-90 (2000) (noting numerous "longstanding, accepted statutes carrying into 
execution the federal judicial power under the Necessary and Proper Oause"). 
One could take a radically narrow view of the Necessary and Proper Oause so as to 
call the Schiavo legislation into question, but such a view would not only sweep away all 
of the statutes noted above, but would also sweep away the full faith and credit statute, 
Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122, which has governed proceedings in federal courts 
since 1790. See Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial 
Decision-Making, 18 CONST. CoMMENT. 191 (2001). Lawson concedes that his approach 
is both an "'extraordinary challenge to congressional power"' and '"an extraordinary de-
parture from settled law."' !d. at 226 (quoting Paulsen supra, at 1590). 
To appreciate just how extraordinary the challenge and the departure, consider that 
Lawson relies on the capacious claim that, under the Necessary and Proper Oause, Con-
gress "can pass substantive laws, but it cannot tell the courts how to identify, construe, 
and apply them." !d. at 211. Thus his principle would invalidate statutes calling for liberal 
construction of their provisions, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 458aaa-11 (2000) ("Each provision of 
this part and each provision of a compact or funding agreement shall be liberally con-
strued for the benefit of the Indian tribe participating in self-governance and any ambi-
guity shall be resolved in favor of the Indian tribe."); the Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 
(2000) (providing that, unless the context indicates otherwise, singular includes the plu-
ral, masculine includes the feminine, and "person" includes corporations); id. § 2 (provid-
ing that "county" includes parish); the statutes making the Statutes at Large and the 
United States Code evidence of the law, 1 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) ("The United States Stat-
utes at Large shall be legal evidence of laws, concurrent resolutions, treaties, interna-
tional agreements other than treaties, proclamations by the President, and proposed or 
ratified amendments to the Constitution of the United States therein contained, in all the 
courts of the United States, the several States, and the Territories and insular possessions 
of the United States."); 1 U.S.C. § 204 (2000) ("In all courts, tribunals, and public offices 
of the United States, at home or abroad, of the District of Columbia, and of each State, 
Territory, or insular possession of the United States ... The matter set forth in the edi-
tion of the Code of Laws of the United States current at any time shall ... establish 
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While there are colorable arguments that when Congress 
gives a federal court jurisdiction, it cannot re~uire the court to 
defer to another's interpretation of federal law, 7 it is particularly 
odd for an opinion proclaiming judicial independence to assert 
the unconstitutionality of a statute requiring a federal court to 
decide a federal claim independently. 
Judge Birch similarly claims, with little elaboration, that it 
was unconstitutional for Congress to provide for federal adjudi-
cation of federal claims notwithstanding prior state court deci-
sions and proceedings.48 He never identifies, however, the source 
prima facie the laws of the United States"); or even, it would seem, definitional sections 
of statutes. See, e.g., 5 U .S.C. § 551 (2000) (defining "agency" for purposes of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act). 
Lawson concedes that, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress can enact 
laws governing judicial procedure, Lawson, supra, at 224. Thus, he agrees that the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause empowers Congress to enact both substantive laws and proce-
dural laws. In a sign of just how far awry he has gone, however, he somehow carves out 
something that, in his view, is apparently neither substantive nor procedural. While the 
line between substance and procedure is notoriously fuzzy, and while a particular law 
might be classified as partaking of both substance and procedure, Lawson effectively de-
clares a broad swath of law-including the law of evidence and the law of remedies-to 
be neither substantive nor procedural, and thereby outside congressional control. Cf D. 
Michael Risinger, "Substance" and "Procedure" Revisited, With Some Afterthoughts on 
the Constitutional Problems of "Irrebuttable Presumptions," 30 UCLA L. REv. 189, 
190-204 (1982-83) (tracing the development of the substance/procedure distinction from 
the right/remedy distinction and stating that a legal provision declaring the appropriate 
remedy, "reflecting and conditioning the value judgment behind the definition of the 
right," is substantive). On Lawson's view, as he acknowledges, the venerable Anti-
Injunction Act, Act of March 2, 1793, § 5, 1 Stat. 335, is unconstitutional, as are the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, with the Rules of Decision Act, Judiciary Act of 1789, § 34, 1 
Stat. 73, saved only by treating it as "an exhortation rather than a regulation, along the 
lines of 'decide cases correctly,' or 'observe National Vinegar Month."' Lawson, supra, at 
217, 224, 226. His approach is, if possible, even more radical than he acknowledges, for if 
the law of remedies is outside Congressional control, then all statutes that establish and 
define rights of action are unconstitutional. 
47. See James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, "Some Effectual Power": The Quan-
tity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 
696 (1998). Cf Irons v. Carey, 408 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2005) (ordering supplemental 
briefing regarding whether the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 
which provides for federal habeas relief if a state court decision was "contrary to, or in-
volved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by 
the Supreme Court of the United States," "unconstitutionally prescribes the sources of 
law that the Judicial Branch must use in exercising its jurisdiction or unconstitutionally 
prescribes the substantive rules of decision by which the federal courts must decide con-
stitutional questions that arise in state habeas cases"). It is far from obvious, however, 
that Congress may not create some statutory remedies-not themselves constitutionally 
required-that are available only for some subset of constitutional violations. See 
FALLON ET AL., supra note 33, at 1350-51 (noting that Liebman and Ryan's analysis, 
though "rich and complex," also "bristles with difficulties," including tensions with doc-
trines ranging from qualified immunity to res judicata). 
48. Schiavo ex rei. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1271 (11th Cir. 2005) (Birch, 
J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en bane). 
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of the ordinary obligation of a federal court to give preclusive 
effect to a state court judgment: the full faith and credit statute 
enacted by Congress.4 The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the 
Constitution,50 by contrast, does not require federal courts to 
give full faith and credit to state court judgments, for the crucial 
reason that if it did, federal supremacy would be at an end-or 
very nearly so.51 It is not simply that statutes providing federal 
habeas for those in state custody pursuant to a state court judg-
ment would be unconstitutional if the Constitution required that 
federal courts give preclusive effect to state court judgments, so 
too would statutes providing for Supreme Court review of state 
court judgments. 52 
Judge Birch also contends that the Act is unconstitutional in 
"denying federal courts the ability to exercise abstention or in-
quire as to exhaustion," thereby "rob[bing] federal courts of ju-
49. 28 U.S.C. §1738 (2000) (providing that judicial proceedings of any court of any 
State "shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States ... 
as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State ... from which they are taken"). 
50. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full faith and Credit shall be given in each State to 
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Con-
gress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Pro-
ceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."). 
51. See John J. Gibbons, Federal Law and the State Couns 1790-1860,36 RUTGERS 
L. REv. 399, 399 (1984) (noting that Supreme Court "review of state final judgments re-
jecting federal law claims" is "the bare minimum essential for the preservation of the su-
premacy of national law"). 
52. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-51 (1816) (uphold-
ing the constitutionality of§ 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789). 
For the same reason, the holding of Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211 (1995), 
cannot sensibly be applied to protect state court decisions in federal court. Indeed, Plaut 
specifically distinguished prior "decisions upholding legislation that altered rights fixed 
by the final judgments of non-Article III courts." ld. at 232. See, e.g., Sampeyreac v. 
United States, 32 U.S. 222 (1833) (upholding statute permitting a previously time-barred 
appeal to the Supreme Court from a territorial court); Freeborn v. Smith, 69 U.S. 160 
(1864) (same); Pararnino Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 309 U.S. 370, 374-76 (1940) (uphold-
ing a private act directing review of an order under the Longshoremen's and Harbor 
Workers' Compensation Act passed nearly five years "after there had been a final award 
by the deputy commissioner and after the time for review of the award had expired," 
where it was subsequently discovered that the claimant's disability continued longer than 
expected). See also Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445 (1899) (upholding statute 
permitting Supreme Court review of otherwise final decision of the United States Court 
in Indian Territory and noting that "while it is undoubtedly true that legislatures cannot 
set aside the judgments of courts, compel them to grant new trials, order the discharge of 
offenders, or direct what steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry, the 
grant of a new remedy by way of review has been often sustained under particular cir-
cumstances"); 1 THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON 1HE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITATIONS WHICH REsT UPON 1HE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF 1HE STATES OF 1HE 
AMERICAN UNION 193, n.4 (8th ed., 1927) (noting state cases upholding "a statute allow-
ing an appeal in a particular case" as well as a "retroactive statute, giving the right of ap-
peal in cases in which it had previously been lost by lapse of time," while also noting con-
flicting state authority). 
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dicial doctrines long-established for the conduct of prudential 
decisionmaking. "53 Here he has things exactly backwards. The 
key separation of powers problem with "judicial doctrines" of 
abstention and exhaustion is the legitimacy of courts creating 
such doctrines in the first place.54 As John Marshall put it, "We 
have no more right to decline the exercise of a jurisdiction which 
is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the 
other would be treason to the constitution. "55 The best defense 
of such judicially-created common law doctrines is that they are 
permissible so long as they are, among other things, subject to 
"continued oversight by the legislative branch."56 
In each instance, Judge Birch treats statutory or common 
law doctrines as if they were constitutional requirements.57 
While it is always tempting to assume that what is familiar is 
somehow required by the constitution,58 to do so is a fundamen-
tal error. 
IV. THE RETREAT TO A MUCH NARROWER CLAIM 
In a footnote responding to Judge Tjoflat's dissent, Judge 
Birch narrows his argument considerably. He explicitly concedes 
that it is constitutionally permissible for Congress to enact stan-
dards of review, and seems to concede that Congress can with-
draw the ability to use doctrines of abstention, exhaustion, and 
53. Schiavo, 404 F.3d at 1274. 
54. See Martin Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judi-
cial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984). 
55. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821). Cf U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 4 (provid-
ing that "all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Im-
peachment for, and Conviction of, Treason .... "); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 ("Treason 
against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or, in adhering 
to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort."). 
56. David Shapiro,Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543,589 (1985). 
57. lndeed, at one point, he appears to suggest that the pre-existing statutory allo-
cation of federal jurisdiction is somehow of constitutional stature. Schiavo, 404 F.3d at 
1273 ("If the Act only provided for jurisdiction consistent with Article III and 28 U .S.C. § 
1331, the Act would not be in violation of the principles of separation of powers."). 
58. See Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Coun Jurisdiction: 
An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REv. 895, 905 (1984) (noting 
that the "main question" raised by a claimed "essential functions" limitation on Congres-
sional power to make regulations and exceptions to the Supreme Court's appellate juris-
diction is whether it "confuses the familiar with the necessary, the desirable with the con-
stitutionally mandated"); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (stating that "the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar 
or novel or even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question 
whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States"). 
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waiver so long as it does so "in a cate.pory of cases like habeas 
corpus," rather than "in a single case."5 
Judge Birch seems to think that Congress engaged in the ju-
dicial task of applying existing law in a particular case rather 
than the legislative task of making new law. But Congress did 
not dictate how the existing law of preclusion, abstention, or ex-
haustion applied in a particular case; it simply made new law. 
Congress did not "invite"60 the courts to change the law of juris-
diction, preclusion, abstention, or exhaustion-Congress estab-
lished the governing law in those areas itself. While the line be-
tween these two may not be perfectly clear, particularly in cases 
where Congress writes narrowly-focused laws, a comparison with 
cases in which the Supreme Court found Congressional action to 
be legislative rather than judicial-to be making new law rather 
than applying existing law-demonstrates that Congressional ac-
tion much closer to applying existing law has nevertheless been 
understood as making new law. 
In Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society,61 Congress re-
sponded to environmental litigation then pending in the federal 
courts by "determin[ing] and direct[ing]" that management of 
specified lands in specified ways 
is adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting the 
statutory requirements that are the basis for the consolidated 
cases captioned Seattle Audubon Society, et al. v. F. Dale 
Robertson, Civil No. 89-160 and Washington Contract Log-
gers Assoc. et al., v. F. Dale Robertson, Civil No. 89-99 (order 
granting preliminary injunction) and the case Portland Audu-
bon Society et al., v. Manual Lujan, Jr., Civil No. 87-1160-
FR.62 
The Supreme Court unanimously concluded that the statute 
"comgelled changes in law, not findings or results under old 
law." It found "nothing ... that purported to direct any par-
ticular findings of fact or applications of law, old or new, to 
fact." 64 
Similarly, in INS v. Chadha, Justice Powell concluded that 
the House of Representatives had acted judicially rather than 
59. Schiavo, 404 F.3d at 1275 n.4. 
60. ld. at 1276. 
61. 503 u.s. 429 (1992). 
62. /d. at 435 n.2. 
63. !d. at 438. 
64. ld. 
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legislatively in resolving that Chadha should be deported.65 The 
majority, however, explicitly rejected Justice Powell's view, find-
ing it "clear" that the House action "was an exercise of legisla-
tive power."66 It explained that the House action "had the pur-
pose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties7 and relations of persons . . . outside the legislative branch. "6 Indeed, the 
Court stated that unless "other constitutional principles place 
substantive limitations," Congress would "presumably retain the 
power ... to enact a law ... mandating a particular alien's de-
portation."68 Judge Birch's approach is much like that of Justice 
Powell-indeed, Judge Birch cites Justice Powell's opinion.69 But 
Judge Birch does not mention that at least seven (and probably 
eight) members of the Supreme Court disagreed with Justice 
Powell.70 (And this in a paean to the duty of judges to follow 
precedent.) 
Judge Birch criticizes Congressional action that does not 
apply to a "category of cases" as "lack[ing] the generality and 
prospectivity of legislation that comports with the basic tenets of 
the separation of powers."71 However much ideal-typical legisla-
tion may be general and prospective, the United States Constitu-
tion does not contain a blanket prohibition on special or retroac-
tive legislation.72 The relevant prohibitions in the United States 
65. 462 U.S. 919, 96-ki5 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating 
that "the House's action appears clearly adjudicatory" because it "did not enact a general 
rule; rather it made its own determination that six specific persons did not comply with 
certain statutory criteria"). 
66. /d. at 957; see id. at n.22 ("We are satisfied that the one-House veto is legislative 
in purpose and effect .... "). 
67. /d. at 952. 
68. I d. at 935 n.S. 
69. Schiavo ex rei Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1275 (11th Cir. 2005). 
70. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 957 (six justice majority opinion); id. at 1001 (White, J., 
dissenting) ("Nor does § 244 infringe on the judicial power, as Justice Powell would 
hold."). Justice Rehnquist's dissent does not mention Justice Powell's argument at all. He 
instead relies entirely on a disagreement with the majority's severability analysis, explain-
ing, "Because I do not believe that§ 244(c)(2) is severable, I would reverse the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals." Id. at 1016 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). lbis statement only 
makes sense on the assumption that he found the legislative veto contained in§ 244(c)(2) 
to be unconstitutional, although he did not explain why. Perhaps Justice Rehnquist 
agreed with Justice Powell, or perhaps he had other unmentioned reasons for this conclu-
sion of unconstitutionality. However, given that his opinion is directed to the majority's 
severability analysis, his failure to explain the basis for his conclusion of unconstitutional-
ity is best understood to reflect agreement with the majority (including the majority's 
rejection of Justice Powell's approach) except regarding severability. 
71. /d. 
72. See Paramino Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 309 U.S. 370, 380 (1940) ("Private acts, 
as s.uch, a.re not forbidden by the Constitution. That instrument contains no provision 
agamst pnvate acts enacted by the federal government except for a prohibition of bills of 
attainder and grants of nobility.") (footnote omitted). "The constitutions of many of the 
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Constitution are much narrower: bills of attainder and titles of 
nobility are unconstitutional, as are ex post facto laws.73 Just as 
the ex post facto clause is not a blanket prohibition on retroac-
tive legislation, but rather "has long been recognized" to apply 
"only to penal statutes which disadvantage the offender affected 
by them,"74 so, too, the attainder clause is not a blanket prohibi-
tion on special or private legislation, but instead "prohibits legis-
latures from singling out disfavored gersons and meting out 
summary punishment for past conduct." 5 Accordingly, Congress 
has regularly enacted special or private legislation from the 
founding to the present day.76 Of course, other constitutional 
limitations apply to such legislation, but an Act of Congress is 
states, unlike the federal, forbid private legislation." /d. at 380 n.24 (noting that there 
"are restrictions against the enactment of special legislation in the constitutions of all the 
states except Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Vermont"). 
73. U.S. CONST. art., I § 9 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be 
passed."); id. ("No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States."). See also 
U.S. CoNST. art. IV,§ 1 ("Full faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public 
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by 
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be 
proved, and the Effect thereof."). The prohibition against takings without just compensa-
tion can similarly be understood as a limitation on one kind of special law: a law that 
takes a particular person's property for a public purpose. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation"). 
In addition, some laws must be "uniform" in some sense. See U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8 
("Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States"); id. ("uni-
form Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcy throughout 
the United States"). 
74. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 41 (1990); see California v. Morales, 514 U.S. 
499 (1995); Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 692-93 (2004) ("in most in-
stances, the antiretroactivity presumption is just that-a presumption rather than a con-
stitutional command"). 
75. Landsgrafv. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244,266 (1994). 
76. See, e.g., 6 Stat. (1846) (entire volume devoted to private laws); id. at 40 (dis-
charging Robert Sturgeon from prison); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (noting "long 
experience" of Congress with "private bill procedure"); Floyd D. Shimamura, The His-
tory of Claims Against the United States: The Evolution From a Legislative to a Judicial 
Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REv. 625, 644 (1985) ("By 1832, half of Congress' time was 
consumed with such private business-Friday and Saturday being fully set aside for such 
purposes."). 
As the Supreme Court explained in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm: 
While legislatures usually act through Jaws of general applicability, that is by no 
means their only legitimate mode of action. Private bills in Congress are still 
common, and were even more so in the days before establishment of the Oaims 
Court. Even laws that impose a duty or liability upon a single individual or firm 
are not on that account invalid-or else we would not have the extensive juris-
prudence that we do concerning the Bill of Attainder Oause, including cases 
which say that it requires not merely "singling out" but also punishme.nt, see, 
e.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315-318 (1946), and a case which says 
that Congress may legislate "a legitimate class of one," Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. 
Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
514 U.S. 211,239 n.9 (1995). 
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not unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds for lack of 
"generality and prospectivity." 
Indeed, some Con~ressional powers pointedly envision in-
dividualized legislation. 7 For example the power to "pay the 
Debts"78 of the United States is the power to pay particular 
debts/9 just as the power to "establish Post Office and post 
Roads"8 is the power to establish particular offices and roads. 81 
Similarly, the power to "promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inven-
tors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discov-
eries"82 is the power to issue particular patents and copyrights.83 
The power to admit new States into Union,84 is the power to ad-
mit particular States.85 Of course, the power to "declare War"86 
is the power to declare particular wars between the United 
States and particular enemies.87 
Consider, too, the canonical example of an implied power of 
Congress--the power to create a corporation.88 Congress has 
never passed a general incorporation law. Instead, it has incor-
porated particular corporations, ranging from the Bank of the 
United States to the American Red Cross.89 
77. See Lawson, supra note 46, at 210 (2001) (noting that some congressional pow-
ers "seem to require by their terms some measure of generality" while "others contem-
plate highly specific legislation"). 
78. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8. 
79. See, e.g., An Act for the relief of Robert Buntin, ch. LX, 6 Stat. 262 (1821) (di-
recting payment of particular individual for surveys he made under the authority of the 
United States). 
80. U.S. CoNST. art. I,§ 8. 
81. See e.g., Act of Feb. 20, 1792, 1 Stat. 232 (establishing various postal roads, in-
cluding one from "Wisscassett in the district of Maine, to Savannah in Georgia" and 
specifying the route); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 421, 428 
(1855) (reciting Act of Congress of August 31, 1852 declaring two particular bridges to be 
post-roads). 
82. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8. 
83. See, e.g., An Act authorizing the Secretary of State to issue a Patent to Thomas 
Oxley, ch.LVII, 6 Stat. 261 (1821). See generally Tyler T. Ochoa, Patent and Copyright 
Extension and the Constitution: A Historical Perspective, 49 J. CoPYRIGHT Soc'y U.S.A. 
19, 46-51, 58-84 (2001) (describing various private acts creating or extending copyrights 
and trademarks). 
84. U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 3. 
85. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 18, 1791, ch. VII, 1 Stat. 191 (admitting Vermont to Un-
ion). 
86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
87. See, e.g., Declaration of State of War Between Imperial German Government 
and United States, 40 Stat. 1 (April 6, 1917). 
88. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819); Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. X, 1 
Stat. 191. 
89. See id.; An Act to incorporate the American National Red Cross, ch. 23, 33 Stat. 
599 (1905); Am. Nat'! Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247 (1992). 
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V. THE CULT OF KLEIN 
But what of United States v. Klein?90 Didn't it hold, as Judge 
Birch said, that it is unconstitutional for Congress to "prescribe a 
'rule of decision' for a particular case"?91 In short, no. Unfortu-
nately, the explanation for this short answer is a bit longer. 
Some twenty-five years ago, Professor Gordon Young ob-
served 
the development among judges and scholars of an uncritical 
devotion which resembles a cult of the Klein case. As with the 
object of most cults, the Klein opinion combines the clear with 
the delphic. Chief Justice Chase's excessively broad and am-
biguous statements for the majority provide the delphic ele-
ments in Klein. His statements have permitted Klein to be 
viewed as nearly all things to all men. 
Viewed as a source of principles protecting the judiciary 
from the other branches, Klein is often stretched extraordi-
narily beyond its facts by advocates and judges.92 
Klein involved a claim for compensation in the Court of 
Claims in the wake of the Civil War. Victor Wilson's cotton had 
been seized by Union agents after the fall of Vicksburg and 
sold.93 Pursuant to an Act of Congress, the owner of such prop-
erty could obtain the proceeds of the sale in the Court of Claims 
"on proof ... of his ownership ... and that he has never given 
any aid or comfort to the present rebellion."94 John Klein, as the 
administrator of Wilson's estate, sought relief under this Act in 
the Court of Claims. 
Wilson had been a surety on the bonds of two Confederate 
officers. In United States v. Padelford,95 the Supreme Court held 
such a suretyship constituted giving comfort to the rebellion.96 
90. 80 u.s. 128 (1871). 
91. Schiavo ex rei. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2005). 
92. Gordon G. Young, CongressioTUll Regulation of Federal Courts' Jurisdiction and 
Processes: United States v. Klein Revisited, 1981 WIS. L. REv. 1189, 1195. For a recent 
example, see Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. Pudelski, Legislative Deception, Sepa-
ration of Powers, and the Democratic Process: Harnessing the Political Theory of United 
States v. Klein, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 437,440 (2006) (gleaning from Klein the principle that 
the judiciary should "polic(e] the legislative process to eliminate ... legislative decep-
tion"); but see id. at 458-59, n. 78-79 (acknowledging that there may have been no actual 
deception involved in Klein). 
93. Young, supra note 92, at 1192,1190. 
94. The Abandoned Property Collection Act, ch. 120, § 3, 12 Stat. 820 (1863). 
95. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1870). 
96. 76 U.S. at 539; see Young, supra note 92, at 1202. 
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Both Wilson and Padelford, however, had been pardoned 
by President Lincoln in accordance with the Presidential proc-
lamation of December 8, 1863.97 That proclamation granted to a 
wide range of rebels "a full pardon ... with restoration of all 
rights of property, except as to slaves, and in property cases 
where rights of third parties shall have intervened" upon the tak-
ing of an oath of allegiance.98 The required oath promised sup-
port of the Constitution, the Union, and the wartime actions of 
both Congress and the President regarding slaves.99 
While Padelford viewed suretyship as giving comfort to the 
rebellion, it also held that the recipient of a Presidential par-
don-at least one who took the required oath prior to the sei-
zure of his property-"was purged of whatever offence against 
the laws of the United States ... and relieved from any penalty 
Which he might have incurred. "100 
After the Court of Claims held that Wilson's estate was en-
titled to recover,101 and while the government's appeal to the 
Supreme Court was pending, Congress attempted to change the 
significance of a Presidential pardon by attaching a rider to an 
appropriations bill. As originally proposed on the floor of the 
Senate, the rider made a pardon inadmissible in the Court of 
Claims to prove loyalty, acceptance of a pardon (without pro-
testing innocence) conclusive evidence of disloyalty, and pro-
vided that the Supreme Court, in cases where the Court of 
Claims had already decided in favor of the claimant based on a 
pardon, "shall, on appeal, reverse such judgment."102 Some ob-
jected that this was an unconstitutional attempt to restrict the ef-
fect of a presidential pardon.103 Others objected that Congress 
should not say that the Supreme Court "shall reverse the judg-
97. See 80 U.S. at 132. 
98. Proclamation No. 11, 13 Stat. 737 (Dec. 8 1868). 
99. /d. at 738. 
100. 76 U.S. at 543. 
101. Professor Young explains, with references not only to the generally cited 1868 
opinion of the Court of Oaims, but also to a less-noticed addendum to that opinion and 
the record of the case, that the Court of Oaims had found Wilson to be loyal in fact, but 
when the government later discovered that Wilson had been a Confederate surety, 
changed the ground of its decision. See 4 a. 0. 559, 567 (1868), modified, 7 a. Cl. vii 
(1871); Young, supra note 92, at 1199 n.55 (explaining that the "only plausible explana-
tion for the Court of Oaims, on rehearing, finding that Wilson's pardon excused disloy-
alty is the decision in United States v. Padelford"). While the original decision of the 
Court of Oaims was rendered before Padelford, its decision on reconsideration was ren-
dered after Padelford. 
102. Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3809 (1870); see Young, supra note 92, at 
1205. 
103. Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3821 (1870). 
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ment."104 To meet the latter objection, the words "reverse such 
judgment" were replaced by the words "have no further jurisdic-
tion thereof, and shall dismiss the cause for want of jurisdiction," 
with Senator Edmund explaining that this language "accom-
plishes the same purpose," and was roreferable "as a matter of 
taste, though not as a matter of law." os The Senate adopted the 
rider by a vote of 34 to 19, with 19 absent, and the appropria-
tions bill, with the rider included, was ultimately adopted by the 
Senate and the House, and signed by the President.106 
In Klein, the Supreme Court refused to dismiss the case, but 
instead affirmed the judgment of the Court of Claims.107 It con-
cluded that the rider was "not an exercise of the acknowledged 
power of Congress to make exceptions and prescribe regulations 
to the appellate power," but instead that its "great and control-
ling purpose is to deny to pardons granted by the President the 
effect which this court had adjudged them to have."108 Indeed, all 
members of the court agreed, as Justice Miller put it in his dis-
senting opinion, that the rider was "unconstitutional, so far as it 
attempts to prescribe to the judiciary the effect to be given to an 
act of pardon or amnesty by the President. "109 
Given the unanimous agreement on this straightforward 
proposition, it might be best to treat this as the narrow holding 
of the case that is obscured by the majority's "confusing" opin-
ion.110 So understood, Klein would stand for (1) the proposition 
104. Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3824 (1870). 
105. !d. 
106. See Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat 230, 235. Why would a President sign 
such a bill? The proviso was bundled with an appropriations bill, and any President may 
be reluctant to veto a bill that contains an unconstitutional provision if the bill as a whole 
is sufficiently important. Indeed, to my mind, a significant comparative competence held 
by the judiciary regarding constitutional interpretation is its ability to unbundle, that is, 
to address particular applications of particular provisions in particular cases rather than 
whole bills. See Edward A. Hartnett, Modest Hope for a Modest Roberts Court: Defer-
ence, Facial Challenges, and the Comparative Competence of Courts, 59 SMU L. Rev. _ 
(forthcoming 2006). 
107. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 148 (1871). 
108. 80 U.S. at 145--46. 
109. 80 U.S. at 148 (Miller, J.,joined by Bradley, J., dissenting). 
110. See Young, supra note 15, at 1193 (describing the opinion as "confusing"); 
FALLON ET AL., supra note 33, at 339 (noting that the opinion is "hardly a model of clar-
ity" and "raises more questions than it answers"); Uebman & Ryan, supra note 47, at 815 
(describing the opinion's analysis as "unruly"); Barry Friedman, The History of the Coun-
termajoritarian Difficulty, Part II: Reconstruction's Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1, 34 
(2002) (stating that the opinion is "sufficiently impenetrable that calling it opaque is a 
compliment"); Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 
GEO. L.J. 2537, 2549 (1998) ("I do not think that there is an entirely tidy account of the 
Klein opinion. Much that is said in the opinion is exaggerated if not dead wrong .... "). 
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that Congress cannot require the judiciary to adhere to Con-
gress' interpretation of the Constitution and (2) the proposition 
that the Supreme Court interprets the Constitution to require 
the recipient of a pardon to be treated as if he had never com-
mitted the crime. 11 
But there are two difficulties with this approach. First, al-
though discussion of the presidential pardon is woven through-
out the opinion, a brief passage near the end of the opinion ap-
pears to treat the infringement of the President's Rower to grant 
pardons as an independent ground for decision. 2 Second, the 
case involved a claim against the United States, and some addi-
tional explanation is required to justify affirming a judgment 
against the United States, despite sovereign immunity, in the 
face of an apparent Congressional desire to deny recovery.113 
A fuller understanding of the majority opinion appears by 
focusing on the disagreement between the majority and the dis-
sent. For the dissenters, there was a crucial difference between a 
case such as Padelford, in which the rebel took the oath and was 
pardoned prior to the seizure of his property, and Klein, in which 
the rebel took the oath after the seizure of his property. As Jus-
tice Miller explained: 
[ A]s long as the possession or title of property remains in the 
party, the pardon or amnesty remits all right in the govern-
111. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 33, at 340 (claiming that the "judgment is ade-
quately supported by ... the clear holding that the rule of decision prescribed by Con-
gress in Klein abridged the President's pardon power"). Under this approach, Klein 
would also stand for the proposition that a statute that purports to give the Supreme 
Court jurisdiction to reverse, but not jurisdiction to affirm, regardless of what judgment 
the Supreme Court believes is constitutionally required, is "not an exercise of the ac-
knowledged power of Congress to make exceptions and prescribe regulations to the ap-
pellate power," 80 U.S. at 146; see also FALLON ET AL., supra note 33 at 339 (suggesting 
that Klein is "surely right ... that invocation of the language of 'jurisdiction' is not a tal-
isman"). See also Meltzer, supra note 110, at 2538-39 (suggesting that Klein could be 
read as positing "that a straightforward rule denying compensation to recipients of par-
dons would unconstitutionally infringe the President's authority under Article II, and 
that Congress may not use jurisdictional limits to achieve the same result" or that "Con-
gress may not give courts jurisdiction on the condition that they refrain from reaching a 
result that the Constitution may demand"); id. at 2549("whatever the breadth of Con-
gress's power to regulate federal court jurisdiction, it may not exercise that power in a 
way that requires a federal court to act unconstitutionally"). 
112. 80 U.S. at 147. See Lawrence G. Sager, Klein's First Principle: A Proposed Solu-
tion, 86 GEO. L.J. 2525, 2526 (1998) (describing this aspect of Klein as an "alternate 
ground ... plainly of secondary importance"); Meltzer, supra note 110, at 2539 n.12 (not-
ing objections to the narrow reading). 
113. Cf. Liebman & Ryan, supra note 47, at 822 (claiming that "[a]ssertions of sover-
eign immunity are sufficiently like denials of jurisdiction that an Article III analysis of 
the latter applies as well to the former"). 
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ment to forfeit or confiscate it. But where the property has al-
ready been seized and sold, and the proceeds paid into the 
treasury, and it is clear that the statute contemplates no fur-
ther proceeding as necessary to divest the right of the former 
owner, the pardon does not and cannot restore that which has 
thus completely passed away.114 
In light of this ground of dissent, the majority was at pains 
at the outset of its opinion to emphasize that the category of 
"captured and abandoned property" was a "peculiar" one, 
"known only in the recent war," and with no precedent in his-
tory.115 Such property, as the majority saw it, was not "divested 
absolutely out of the original owners," but instead went "into the 
treasury without change of ownership."116 As to such property, 
the "government constituted itself the trustee for those ... enti-
tled to the proceeds."117 
From this perspective, once the property owner took the re-
quired oath, "the pardon and its connected promises took effect. 
The restoration of the proceeds became the absolute right of the 
persons pardoned."118 Indeed, to fail to restore the property to 
its owner as promised would be a "breach of faith not less 'cruel 
and astounding' than to abandon the freed people whom the Ex-
ecutive had promised to maintain in their freedom." 119 
The reference to the Emancipation Proclamation is reveal-
ing, 120 for it helps us to understand that the pardon plays two dis-
tinct roles in the majority opinion. One role is as the basis for 
concluding that the rider "impair[ ed] the effect of a pardon, and 
thus infring[ ed] the constitutional power of the Executive." 121 It 
has another role, however, as the mechanism by which a right 
was vested. In this role, there is nothing particularly distinctive 
about a pardon. Other legal instruments, such as the Emanci~a­
tion Proclamation or a simple deed, also created vested rights. 22 
114. 80 U.S. at 150 (Miller, J., dissenting). 
115. Id. at 136, 138. 
116. Id. at 138. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 142. 
119. Id. The internal quotation is from President Lincoln's message to Congress ex-
plaining his reasons for the required oath in connection with the pardon. See id. at 140 
(providing excerpts from the message). 
120. The Emancipation Proclamation declared that "all persons held as slaves" in 
certain designated areas in rebellion "are, and henceforth shall be, free." Proclamation 
No. 17,12 Stat. 1268, 1269 (Jan 1, 1863). 
121. 80 U.S. at 147. 
122. Cf Young, supra note 92, at 1214 n.136 (suggesting that a due process argument 
may "have been accepted sub silentio," helping to explain "why Chase took pains to ar-
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The language of vested rights has largely fallen from our 
federal constitutional discourse. But it was a dominant feature of 
general constitutional law for decades. For example, in Fletcher 
v. Peck, the Supreme Court found Georgia's attempt to rescind a 
land grant unconstitutional, explaining that "if an act be done 
under a law, a succeeding legislature cannot undo it. The past 
cannot be recalled by the most absolute power. Conveyances 
have been made, those conveyances have vested legal estates." 123 
As Chancellor Kent put it, "A retrospective statute, affecting 
and changing vested rights, is very generally considered, in this 
country, as founded on unconstitutional principles, and conse-
quently inoperative and void."124 
The Supreme Court of the United States plainly took ac-
count of such general constitutional law precepts when reviewing 
cases on appeal from the inferior federal courts, even though, 
due to statutory limitations on its jurisdiction, it did not do so on 
review of state court judgments. 25 Moreover, it also took ac-
count of such precepts when deciding cases involving federal 
statutes, although it tended to blur the distinction between con-
stitutional and statutory analysis.126 Klein, which was on appeal 
from a lower federal court, the Court of Claims, displays such 
blurring of constitutional and statutory analysis. While it speaks 
gue that Wilson had retained a property interest in the proceeds"). 
123. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810). 
124. 1 JAMES KENT, CoMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 455 (12th ed., 1873) 
{O.W. Holmes, ed.). See also 2 THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WmCH REsT UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE 
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 749-50 (8'" ed., 1927) (quoting Kent's statement and 
explaining that a "mere expectation of property in the future is not considered a vested 
right"). 
125. See Davidson v. City of New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 105 (1877) ("It may possibly 
violate some of those principles of general constitutional law of which we could take ju-
risdiction if we were sitting in review of a Circuit Court of the United States as we were 
in Loan Association v. Topeka [87 U.S. 655 (1874))."). See generally Michael G. Collins, 
Before Lochner-Diversity Jurisdiction and the Development of General Constitutional 
Law, 74 TuL. L. REv. 1263 (2000); id. at 1304 ("Although these general constitutional 
law precepts could provide a rule of decision in a given case when the federal courts had 
jurisdiction, it is important to recall that they could not confer federal question jurisdic-
tion, either originally (in the lower federal courts) or on direct review of the state courts 
(in the Supreme Court)"). 
126. See Mark A. Graber, Naked Land Transfers and American Constitutional De-
velopment, 53 VAND. L. REV. 73,87-88,94-96 (2000) {discussing cases). Cf John Cope-
land Nagle, Delaware & Hudson Revisited, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1495, 1497, 1499 
(1997) (describing a nineteenth century practice whereby a "court first decided that a 
statute was unconstitutional, and then ... proceeded to adopt an interpretation of the 
statute that avoided the constitutional problem altogether," that is, "a court would an-
nounce that because interpretation x of a statute was unconstitutional, interpretation y 
should be adopted instead"). 
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of a constitutional violation, it also views the violation as "inad-
vertentQ,"127 states that the rider had "perhaps little considera-
tion in either House of Congress,"128 and concludes as follows: 
We repeat that it is impossible to believe that this provision 
was not inserted in the appropriation bill through inadver-
tence; and that we shall not best fulfill the deliberate will of 
the legislature by DENYING the motion to dismiss and 
AFFIRMING the judgment of the Court of Claims. 129 
127. 80 u.s. 128,147 (1871}. 
128. Id. at 143. 
129. Id. at 148. The emphasis on Congressional intent may also reflect an approach 
akin to a severability analysis: If Congress had known that the Supreme Court would 
hold that it was unconstitutional to provide compensation to the loyal without treating 
those who have been pardoned as loyal, see Young, supra note 92, at 1230 ("Congress is 
not free to open the courts to truly innocent plaintiffs while closing them to those whose 
innocence comes by way of pardon"), Congress would have preferred to do without the 
unconstitutional proviso, leaving the pre-existing compensation scheme (including both 
Court of Oaims jurisdiction and Supreme Court appellate review) intact rather than 
have the entire compensation scheme held unenforceable. See Armstrong v. United 
States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154 (1872) (relying on Klein to direct Court of Oaims to con-
sider a claim based on a pardon). See generally United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,246 
(2005) ("We seek to determine what 'Congress would have intended' in light of the 
Court's constitutional holding.") (citation omitted). 
Note that this view is not dependent on an anachronistic notion that an equal protec-
tion component of the due process clause prohibits invidious discrimination against the 
pardoned. See Meltzer, supra note 110, at 2539 n.12 (noting this possibility as an "attrac-
tive modem readingO" while not "the most accurate reconstruction of what the Klein 
Court had in mind a century and a quarter ago"). Instead, it depends on an understand-
ing of the Constitution that, in the eyes of the law, a person who has been pardoned must 
be treated as if he had never committed the offense, so that if Congress wants to provide 
compensation to those who did not engage in rebellion, it must treat the pardoned as if 
they had not engaged in rebellion. 
Using a severability analysis, one might also examine the narrower question whether 
the restriction on the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction could be severed from the 
rest of the compensation scheme, thereby saving at least part of the proviso. There is, 
however, little reason to think that Congress would have preferred to save this aspect of 
the proviso alone, since it would result in the dismissal of the appeal to the Supreme 
Court, leaving the Court of Claims judgment in place. Thus it is easy to conclude that the 
restriction on the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction should fall along with the rest of 
the proviso. 
This approach may help explain more than simply how the Court could claim to 
"best fulfill the deliberate will of the legislature" by exercising jurisdiction. Klein, 80 U.S. 
at 148. It may also help explain how it could simultaneously acknowledge that if the stat-
ute "simply denied the right of appeal in a particular class of cases, there could be no 
doubt that it must be regarded as an exercise of the power of Congress to make 'such 
exceptions from the appellate jurisdiction as should seem to it expedient,"' while exercis-
ing jurisdiction because "the language of the proviso shows plainly that it does not intend 
to withhold appellate jurisdiction except as a means to an end," that is, "to deny to par-
dons granted by the President the effect which this court had adjudged them to have." 80 
U.S. at 145. In other words, if the restriction on the Supreme Court's jurisdiction stood 
alone, it would be perfectly constitutional. Cf. Young, supra note 92, at 1221 (Klein "can 
not be interpreted as holding unconstitutional a pure withholding of appellate jurisdic-
tion"). But since the restriction on the Supreme Court's jurisdiction served no Congres-
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While the Klein opinion is undoubtedly unclear, approach-
ing it from the perspective of the general constitutional law prin-
ciple of vested rights does help to overcome the two difficulties 
with reading the opinion as limited to the pardon power. First, it 
reveals that the pardon is relevant both as an independent 
ground of decision and as one means of creating vested rights. 
Second, it gives some insight into the sovereign immunity prob-
lem: If the claimant had a vested property right and Congress 
constituted the United States as trustee of that property, it might 
be thought that Congress could not (or could not have deliber-
ately intended to) subsequently divest that vested right-just as 
if Congress had previously granted a vested right in some lands, 
it could not (or could not have deliberately intended to) subse-
quently divest the title.130 
This perspective also helps in understanding the passages in 
Klein complaining that the rider involved "a rule of decision, in 
causes pending, prescribed by Congress," and asking rhetori-
cally, "What is this but to prescribe a rule for the decision of a 
cause in a particular way?" and "Can we [follow the rider] with-
out allowing that the legislature may prescribe rules of decision 
to the Judicial Department of the government in cases pending 
before it?"131 
These passages cannot be understood to broadly condemn 
any Act of Congress prescribing a rule of decision, for most any 
sional purpose separate from the unconstitutional rule of decision, it would fall along 
with the rest of the proviso. It is not that the Congressional motive invalidates the restric-
tion on jurisdiction. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869) ("We are 
not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislature. We can only examine into its 
power under the Constitution; and the power to make exceptions to the appellate juris-
diction is given by express words."); cf Friedman, supra note 110, at 35 (finding these 
passages from McCardle and Klein difficult to reconcile). Rather, the restriction on the 
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in the proviso was inseparable from the rest of the 
proviso because the restriction on the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction served no 
Congressional purpose "except as a means" of implementing the unconstitutional rule of 
decision. 
130. See Rice v. R.R. Co., 66 U.S. (1 Black) 358, 374 (1862) (relying on Fletcher v. 
Peck for the proposition that "if the legal effect of the act of Congress" at issue "was to 
grant to the Territory a beneficial interest in the lands, then it is equally clear that it was 
not competent for Congress to pass the repealing act, and divest the title," but concluding 
that this was not the legal effect of the act); Graber, supra note 126, at 82 (discussing 
Rice). Cf Klein, 80 U.S. at 144 ("It was urged in argument that the right to sue the gov-
ernment in the Court of Oaims is a matter of favor; but this seems not entirely accurate. 
It is as much the duty of the government as of individuals to fulfill its obligations."). This 
approach is also less anachronistic than the suggestion that the Just Compensation 
Clause creates an express constitutional remedy. See Meltzer, supra note 110, at 2539 
n.12 (noting this possibility as an "attractive modem readingO" while not "the most accu-
rate reconstruction of what the Klein Court had in mind a century and a quarter ago"). 
131. 80U.S.at146. 
578 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 22:553 
law that comes into play in litigation-whether or not directly 
addressed to courts-prescribes a rule of decision.132 For exam-
ple, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as amended) prescribes nu-
merous rules of decision for courts to use when an employee 
complains of being fired, ranging from the rule of decision that 
racial animosity is not a legitimate basis for the firing133 to the 
rule of decision that makes the presence of such a motivating 
factor sufficient for an employee to prevail, subject to an em-
ployer avoiding damages by proving that it would have fired the 
employee for other reasons anyway.134 Indeed, one of the earli-
est and still enduring Acts of Congress is called the Rules of De-
cision Act, first enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789.135 
As its name indicates, it explicitly directs the federal courts to 
apply certain rules of decision. 136 
Nor can these passages in Klein be understood in a slightly 
more limited way to condemn any Act of Congress prescribing a 
rule of decision for a pending case. Long before and long after 
Klein, the Supreme Court has adhered to the principle that a 
court must apply the law as it finds it at the time of decision, in-
cluding statutory changes made while the case is pending.137 
132. See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 47, at 775 n.362 ("Contrary to the common 
'qualitative' reading of Klein to forbid Congress to 'prescribe rules of decision to the Ju-
dicial Department ... in cases pending before it,' Congress routinely establishes stan-
dards of relief that prescribe rules of decision, and has even been permitted to command 
Article III judges to decide particular pending cases in particular ways.") (citations omit-
ted); FALLON ET AL., supra note 33, at 99 ("How broadly can this language sensibly be 
read?"); see also Lawson, supra note 46, at 208 ("Many statutes effectively preordain the 
outcomes of litigation; there is little point in passing the statutes if they do not.'). Cf. Sosa 
v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713 (2004) (noting that Congressman Fisher Ames 
distinguished between jurisdiction and rules of decision); Schiavo, 404 F.3d at 1280, n.5 
(Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (finding no basis in case law for treating standards of review as 
rules of decision). 
133. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). 
134. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2000). 
135. Rules of Decision Act, Judiciary Act of 1789, § 34,1 Stat. 73. 
136. Id. (providing that "the laws of the several states, except where the constitution, 
treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be re-
garded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States in 
cases where they apply"). 
137. See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103,110 (1801) ("if sub-
sequent to the judgment and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes 
and positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed, or its obligation 
denied. If the law be constitutional ... I know of no court which can contest its obliga-
tion. It is true that in mere private cases between individuals, a court will and ought to 
struggle hard against a construction which will, by a retrospective operation, affect the 
rights of parties .... "); Millerv. French, 530 U.S .. 327,344 (2000) (adhering to Schooner 
Peggy); FALLON ET AL., supra note 33, at 99 (surely Klein "does not cast general doubt 
on the principle ... that the courts are obligated to apply law (otherwise valid) as they 
find it at the time of their decision, including, when a case is on review, new statutes en-
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To see this point in the context of Klein, imagine if Congress 
in 1870 had been in the hands of the Democrats rather than the 
Republicans. (As it happened, Democrats next obtained a ma-
jority of the House in the election of 1874, and of the Senate in 
the election of 1878.138) And suppose further that they believed, 
contrary to Padelford, that a person, otherwise loyal to the Un-
ion, who merely signed a surety bond for a Confederate officer, 
should be treated as loyal and entitled to the proceeds of his cap-
tured and abandoned property. If Congress had amended the 
law so as to permit such a person to recover, and made that 
amendment applicable to pending cases, is it conceivable that 
the Supreme Court would have found it unconstitutional? 
What the Court in Klein rejected was an unlimited power of 
Congress to dictate rules of decision. In particular, it rejected a 
power of Con~ress to proscribe what it called an "arbitrary rule 
of decision,"13 such as a rule of decision that violated the gen-
eral constitutional law principle of vested rights. 140 Seen in this 
light, Klein bears striking parallels to a case decided a few years 
earlier, Gelpcke v. Dubuque/41 where the Court refused to fol-
low a state court's interpretation of state law. In Gelpcke, a city 
had issued municipal bonds in accordance with the then-current 
understanding of state law. Subsequently, the state Supreme 
Court overruled its earlier decisions and held that the city lacked 
acted after the judgment below."); id. at 339 (stating that it "seems doubtful ... that this 
language can be taken at face value"); Young, supra note 92, at 1238 (stating that it "is 
impossible to know whether Chase and those who joined in his opinion took such pas-
sages seriously"). 
Nor can Klein stand for a principle that any law enacted by Congress must sweep 
more broadly than a particular case, for the law in Klein did sweep more broadly than a 
particular case. See Sager, supra note 112, at 2528 n.143 (questioning the statute in 
Robertson for "calling out two specific lawsuits" but noting that "despite Klein's sugges-
tive language about the prescription of a rule of decision 'in a pending case,' Klein itself 
does not share with Robertson this questionable feature" because the statute in Klein 
"had the structural qualities of a general rule for the decision of all claims based on a 
presidential pardon"). See also text accompanying notes 72 to 89, supra (arguing that 
there is no broad constitutional requirement that Congress act by general laws). 
138. See Political Divisions of the House of Representatives, http://clerk.house. 
gov/histHigh!Congressionai_History/partyDiv.html; Political Divisions of the Senate, 
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayoutlhistory/one_item_and_teaserslpartydiv. htm. 
139. 80 u.s. 128, 146 (1871). 
140. The contrast that Klein draws with Wheeling Bridge also illustrates this "vested 
rights" approach. See id. at 146 (distinguishing Wheeling Bridge). In Wheeling Bridge, the 
Court said, in traditional vested rights language, that when "private rights" "have passed 
into judgment the right becomes absolute," but held that the rights at stake in that case 
were public rights. 59 U.S. 421, 431 (1855). 
141. 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1864). Cf Young, supra note 92, at 1244 (noting that "the 
Supreme Court may well have made its decision with no basis other than its own view of 
natural law") (citing Gelpke). 
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the authority to issue the bonds. The Supreme Court of the 
United States insisted that the bondholders be paid, explaininJl 
that the state court decision "can have no effect on the past."1 
The Supreme Court adhered to "the law of this court," which 
rested "upon the plainest principles of justice," reasoning that to 
destroy rights acquired under a contract, valid when made, 
"would be as unjust as to hold that the rights acquired under a 
statute may be lost by its repeal."143 Although state court rules of 
decision regarding state laws and constitutions were ordinarily to 
be followed in federal court, the Supreme Court declared, "We 
shall never immolate truth, justice, and the law, because a state 
tribunal has erected the altar and decreed the sacrifice."144 
Thus the Supreme Court rejected rules of decision, whether 
created by state courts (as in Gelpcke) or by Congress (as in 
Klein), that violated the principle of general constitutional law 
that vested rights could not be destroyed. Klein does not hold 
that Congress lacks the authority to prescribe rules of decision; it 
holds that Congress lacks the authority to prescribe unconstitu-
tional rules of decision.145 Klein does nothing, then, to support 
Judge Birch's opinion.146 
142. 68 U.S. at 206. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 206-07. See also id. at 206-207 ("We are not unmindful of the importance 
of uniformity in the decisions of this court, and those of the highest local courts, giving 
constructions to the laws and constitutions of their own States. It is the settled rule of this 
court in such cases, to follow the decisions of the State courts. But there have been here-
tofore, in the judicial history of this court, as doubtless there will be hereafter, many ex-
ceptional cases."). 
145. See Meltzer supra note 110, at 2540 (agreeing with Professor Sager that "Con-
gress may not compel the courts to speak a constitutional untruth," but rejecting Sager's 
broader reading and application of Klein); cf. Sager, supra note 112, at 2529 (claiming 
that Klein's "first principle" is that the "judiciary will not allow itself to be made to speak 
and act against its own best judgment on matters within its competence which have great 
consequence for our political community"). 
146. Judge Birch does not claim that Michael Schiavo had a vested right to the state 
court judgment, nor attempt more generally to resurrect the vested rights approach to 
constitutional law. Even in the heyday of vested rights jurisprudence, the Supreme Court 
distinguished between laws that affected the right and laws that affected the remedy, 
permitting retroactive remedial laws. See, e.g., Sampeyreac v. United States, 32 U.S. 222 
(1833) (upholding statute permitting a previously time-barred appeal to the Supreme 
Court from a territorial court over a "vested rights" objection and explaining that "such 
retrospective effect is of no unusual course, in laws providing new remedies"); Freeborn 
v. Smith, 69 U.S. 160, 174 (1864) (upholding statute permitting a previously time-barred 
appeal to the Supreme Court from a territorial court over a "vested rights" objection and 
explaining that it "is well settled that where there is no direct constitutional prohibition, a 
state may pass retrospective laws [that] remove an impediment in the way of legal pro-
ceedings"). See also Paramino Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 309 U.S. 370,374-76 (1940) (re-
jecting due process challenge to private act directing review of an order under the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act passed nearly five years "after 
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Nor can Judge Birch take refuge in the fact that Supreme 
Court opinions sometimes describe Klein as finding the rider un-
constitutional because "it prescribed a rule of decision in a case 
pending before the courts."147 None finds an Act of Congress 
unconstitutional on that basis. 
Moreover, one of those decisions specifically distinguishes 
Klein in a way that also applies to Schiavo: "Congress made no 
effort ... to control the [court's] ultimate decision" but rather 
acted to permit the claim to be "resolved on the merits."148 Re-
call that Congress, in the Schiavo legislation, did not attempt to 
dictate the federal judiciary's decision on the merits-or even to 
require a stay pending decision on the merits149 - but simply 
cleared the way for the federal judiciary to exercise its inde-
pendent judgment in resolving the case on the merits. 
VI. THE RULE OF LAW, FEDERALISM, AND 
THE SUPREME COURT 
Simply because Judge Birch's opinion was wrong in many 
ways does not mean that the Schiavo legislation is untroubling. 
Those concerns, however, sound more in federalism and rule of 
law than in separation of powers. 150 
A group of officials in Washington determined that a par-
ticular state court case was important and, suspecting that it had 
been wrongly decided, singled it out from the thousands of cases 
there had been a final award by the deputy commissioner and after the time for review of 
the award had expired," where it was subsequently discovered that the claimant's disabil-
ity continued longer than expected); 1 KENT supra note 124, at 455 (noting that the doc-
trine of vested rights "is not understood to apply to remedial statutes, which may be of a 
retrospective nature, provided that they do not impair contracts, or disturb absolute 
vested rights, and only go to confirm rights already existing, and in furtherance of the 
remedy of curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations"). 
147. United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 404 (1980); see also Glidden v. 
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 568 (1962). 
148. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 405. Sioux Nation is not on all fours with Schiavo, 
however, because it also involved the government's waiver of its own res judicata de-
fense. See also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) ("Whatever the 
precise scope of Klein, however, later decisions have made clear that its prohibition does 
not take hold when Congress 'amend(s] applicable law"'). 
149. Cf. Fed. R. Crim. P. 38(a) ("A sentence of death shall be stayed if an appeal is 
taken from the conviction or sentence."); 28 U.S.C. § 2262(a) (2000) (mandating stay of 
execution in certain state habeas proceedings); see also Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the 
Supreme Court of the United States, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 643,678 (2002) (advocating 
enactment of a statutory provision requiring a stay of a death sentence if the Supreme 
Court grants certiorari). 
150. Cf. Tribe, supra note 2, at 300 (describing Judge Birch as going "out of his way 
to criticize Congress and the second President Bush for flagrantly violating" the "usual 
formulas of federalism, separation of powers, and the rule of law"). 
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decided in state court and provided for its adjudication in a fed-
eral court unburdened by the preclusive effect of the state court 
judgment. Moreover, those officials went out of their way to de-
clare that their decision to single out this case was not to be un-
derstood as establishing a precedent.151 Even if this is not uncon-
stitutional, isn't it an affront to important values of federalism 
and the rule of law? 
Perhaps. But notice that this is what the Supreme Court 
does routinely in deciding to grant certiorari to review state 
court judgments. A group of officials in Washington decides that 
a particular state court case is important and (at least fre-
quently), suspecting that it had been wrongly decided, singles it 
out from the thousands of cases decided in state court and pro-
vides for its adjudication in a federal court (the Supreme Court) 
unburdened by the preclusive effect of the state court judg-
ment.152 Moreover, the Supreme Court goes out of its way to de-
151. See Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. 109-3, § 
7,119 Stat. 15, 16 (2005) ("Nothing in this Act shall constitute a precedent with respect to 
future legislation, including the provision of private relief bills."). 
152. It might be tempting to distinguish Supreme Court review of state court judg-
ments from the Schiavo legislation by noting that the Schiavo legislation envisioned a 
federal court redetermining the facts. But while the Supreme Court's practice is not to 
take evidence itself, it does sometimes insist on independently determining the facts. See, 
e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 
587 (1935); see generally Henry Monaghan, Constitutio1Ull Fact Review, 85 CoLUM. L. 
REV. 229 (1985). Indeed, except as limited by the Seventh Amendment, Congress could 
readily use its power of making regulations of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction 
to require the Supreme Court to redetermine the facts. At the founding, an appeal-as 
opposed to a writ of error-subjected the facts to review and retrial. As Chief Justice 
Ellsworth explained regarding the Judiciary Act of 1789, the "Judicial Statute of the 
United States speaks of an Appeal and of a Writ of Error; but it does not confound the 
terms, nor use them promiscuously. They are to be understood, when used, according to 
their ordinary acceptation, unless something appears in the act itself to controul, modify, 
or change, the fixed and technical sense which they have previously borne. An appeal is a 
process of civil law origin, and removes a cause entirely; subjecting the fact as well as the 
law, to a review and re-trial: but a writ of error is a process of common law origin, and it 
removes nothing for re-examination but the law." Wiscart v. D'Auchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 
321,327 (1796). 
Moreover, the Supreme Court sometimes even insists on independently determining 
state law. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112-15 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concur-
ring); see generally Henry Monaghan, Supreme Coun Review of State Coun Determina-
tions of State lAw, 103 CoLUM. L. REV. 1919 (2003). The Schiavo legislation did not spe-
cifically address whether the federal courts could redetermine state law determinations, 
and the case as presented did not require deciding this question. See Schiavo ex rei. 
Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1282 (11th Cir. 2005) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) ("Sepa-
rate questions might arise if, upon reviewing the merits of the case, we determined that 
the parties had called upon the district court to review a state court judgment of state 
law."); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000) ("Except ... as expressly provided otherwise by Fed-
eral statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the 
district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so re-
lated to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the 
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clare that its decision whether or not to single out a case is not to 
be understood as a establishing a precedent.153 
Those who find themselves appalled by the Schiavo legisla-
tion should ask themselves why they are so unconcerned by the 
routine practice of the Supreme Court.154 
We have already seen that Congress did not attempt to de-
cide the merits of the Schiavo case. Notice another thing that 
Congress did not do in the Schiavo legislation. It did not do any-
thing about the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. 
It did not do what Congress had done in Klein. It did not 
use the phrase "shall dismiss the cause for want of jurisdiction," 
to mean "shall, on appeal, reverse such judgment." It did not tell 
the Supreme Court to decide a case without regard to the judici-
ary's understanding of the Constitution. 
It also did not exercise what Klein itself described as the 
"acknowledged power of Congress to make exceptions and pre-
scribe regulations to the appellate power."155 It did not require 
the Supreme Court to exercise "appellate Jurisdiction, both as to 
Law and Fact,"156 in the Schiavo case.157 Instead, while Congress 
provided for jurisdiction in the United States District Court for 
the Middle District of Florida (and therefore, under preexisting 
statutes, appellate jurisdiction in the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit), it left the Supreme Court with 
the unfettered discretion to choose whether or not to exercise 
jurisdiction. 
*** 
Frequently, before a person speaks, he clears his throat. The 
resulting sound may not be particularly pleasant-radio station 
same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution."). 
153. See, e.g., Singleton v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 439 U.S. 940 (1978) (Ste-
vens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari). 
154. Cf. Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five 
Years After the Judges' Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1643 (2000). 
155. 80 u.s. 128, 146 (1871). 
156. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2. 
157. Beginning with the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Supreme Court has viewed stat-
utes that by their terms purport to confer appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme Court as 
an exercise of the power to make exceptions to that jurisdiction, by impliedly withdraw-
ing jurisdiction in the cases not expressly conferred. Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. 
(6 Cranch) 307 (1810). An alternative formulation which Congress could use to compel 
the Supreme Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction would be to repeal pro tanto all 
stat~tes that permit the Supreme Court to decline jurisdiction or limit its extent, thereby 
leaVIng the Court obligated to exercise appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and to fact, 
in the case. 
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microphones generally have a button the speaker can press to 
prevent the sound from reaching the audience158-but it is some-
times the only way for the speaker to find his voice. Other times, 
the throat clearing is not a prelude to speech, but rather is itself a 
means of sending a message. And sometimes there is just some-
thing that sticks in the craw and needs to be cleared. 
In enacting the Schiavo legislation, perhaps Congress was 
simply trying to do something about a particular tragedy that 
stuck in its craw. Or perhaps it was sending a message to federal 
courts. If so, it is clear that Judge Birch, at least, did not get the 
message. But perhaps Congress was doing something more: 
maybe it was beginning to find its voice to assert control over the 
jurisdiction of federal courts. 
158. Elle James, Let's Visit a Radio Station: KFAN Radio Station Field Trip, avail-
able at http:// www.sararwa.com/articleslradio.html; Susan Huff, It:s a Classic, TENN. 
ALUMNUS ONLINE, available at http://pr.utk.edu/alumnuslsummer97/J2.html. 
